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Since 1994, South Africa has become host to refugees from African continent and overseas. Refugees flee their countries for 
various reasons, including persecution and insecurity. Under international law and South African law, it is unlawful to deport a 
person who wishes to claim for asylum. Deporting asylum seekers violates the principle of non-refoulement, which is the most 
fundamental principle of refugee law. This principle guarantees a person’s right not to be forcibly returned to a place where the 
person would face a threat of persecution or a real risk of torture or cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment or punishment. 
Deportees in inadmissible facility have right to apply for asylum in the Republic of South Africa. They are located in an area 
that is under the sovereignty of the RSA. Therefore, the Bill of Rights in the Constitution, international conventions and 
municipal laws governing refugees and asylum seekers apply to such individuals. Once there is an indication to apply for 
asylum, the officials of Home Affairs have a duty to assist the concerned person to file such application at a Refugee Reception 
Office. Government officials, who intentionally fail to perform their tasks as provided by the statutes and cause hardship to 
persons who expect their assistance, should be ordered to pay punitive costs. This will encourage government officials to 
perform their duties adequately without unreasonable delay. 
 





Since South Africa’s transition to full democracy in 1994, it has become host to refugees from across the African 
Continent and overseas. These refugees have fled their countries for various reasons, including seeking protection and 
prosperity. Under South African and international law, it is unlawful to deport anyone who wishes to claim asylum. The 
South African Refugees Act 130 of 1998 has built-in the principle of International and Regional Conventions pertaining to 
the rights and protection of refugees. Deporting asylum seekers violates the most fundamental principle of refugee law, 
the principle of non-refoulement, which guarantees a person’s right not to be forcibly returned to a place where the 
person would face a threat of persecution or a real risk of torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
punishment (Refugees Act130 of 130, s 21 (4) and Regulation 2 (2) of the Refugee Regulation). It is against this 
backdrop that the writers analyse the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeals in Abdi and Another v Minister of Home 
Affairs and Others 2011 (5) BCLR 529 (SCA), 2011 3 SA 37 (SCA) (hereinafter referred to as the Abdi case). 
In Abdi case, the court ordered the release of the deportees who were in transit in inadmissible facility at the OR 
Tambo International Airport from Namibia to Somalia via South Africa. The appellants were held in inadmissible facility at 
the OR Tambo International Airport. They were respectively asylum seeker and refugee in South Africa before they left 
and went to Namibia where they fought they could be resettled to a developed state like Canada. Their release creates a 
precedent that South Africa cannot be involved in a deportation of a refugee or asylum seeker to a place where they may 
be persecuted. 
 
2. The facts 
 
The appellants were the citizens of Somalia. They fled Somalia and travelled to the Republic of South Africa (RSA) to 
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seek for asylum. First appellant was a registered asylum seeker. Second appellant was a recognised refugee. However, 
because of their fears of xenophobia in the RSA, they left for Namibia after being told that the officers of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Namibia might be able to arrange for their admission to a country 
like Canada where they could further their education. They left South Africa to Namibia without informing the authorities. 
They were then arrested and deported from Namibia as illegal aliens. Appellants were flown by Air Namibia to 
Johannesburg in order to deport them. The intention was to transport them to Mogadishu. Appellant were held in the 
inadmissible facility at the OR Tambo International Airport. Subsequently, they were told that they were to be put on an 
Air Kenya flight to Mogadishu via Nairobi. They feared that their lives would be in danger if they were to be forced to 
return to Somalia. Pamela Msizi (Msizi), a protection officer from the UNHCR, attempted to assist them. 
Msizi contacted and engaged with the Department of Home Affairs. The officers tasked to deal with appellants’ 
case refused to permit their entry into the RSA adopting the stance that appellants were Namibian deportees and that the 
South African authorities had no jurisdiction to interfere with another state’s deportation order. Msizi then initiated urgent 
proceedings in the North Gauteng High Court aimed at interdicting the first and second respondent from forcing 
appellants to board a flight to Somalia, and obtaining a mandamus against respondents to facilitate appellants’ re-
admission to the RSA. The application to release the appellants was refused but the court granted leave to appeal to the 
Supreme Court of Appeals (SCA). 
 
3. Respondents’ Argument 
 
Respondents’ main contention was that they lacked jurisdiction to consider or interfere with the deportation order of the 
appellants because they were not legally in the RSA while being detained at the Inadmissible Facility. The Respondents 
argued that the appellants were Namibian deportees making them the responsibility of Namibia. The respondents’ 
alternate argument was that, as deportees of another country, the appellants had no right to invoke the protection of the 
Refugees Act 130 of 1998. An additional argument brought by the respondents was that the department had had no 
record of the appellants and even if they did, the appellants had waived their right to be considered as refugees or 
asylum seekers when they left RSA without the necessary consent from the Minister or any other authority. 
 
4. Appellants’ Argument  
 
The respondent’s allegation that the department has no record of the appellants was refuted in the replying affidavits. 
The first appellant’s status as asylum seeker was recognised by his file, the second appellant’s status as refugee was 
established from his permit. In the High Court, it was found that the applicants had not established their status as 
recognised refugee and asylum seeker and that South African courts lacked jurisdiction to interfere with Namibian 
deportation order. The application was dismissed. Leave to appeal to the SCA was granted by the High Court. The 
applicants were allowed to remain in the facility pending the appeal.  
 
5. The decision 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeals made an order directing the immediate release of appellants from detention in the 
Inadmissible Facility at OR Tambo International Airport. It was declared that the first appellant was entitled to remain in 
the RSA until a decision had been made on his application for asylum and, where applicable, until he had had an 
opportunity to exhaust his rights of review or appeal in terms of chapter 2 of the Refugees Act 130 of 1998 and the 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. It was also declared that the second appellant was entitled to remain 
in the RSA in accordance with his status as a refugee. First and second respondents were directed to issue each of the 
first and second appellants with an asylum transit permit in terms of section 23 of the Immigration Act 13 of 2002. Such 
permits would remain valid for 14 days, during which period the first and second appellants would reside at a certain 
address, or such other address as was provided to them. The first and second respondents were ordered to pay the 




It is submitted that this decision is welcome for the following reasons or respects: 
• Deportees on the port of entry or in inadmissible facility have a right to apply for asylum.  
 E-ISSN 2039-2117 
ISSN 2039-9340        
       Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences
       MCSER Publishing, Rome-Italy 
Vol 4 No 13 
November 2013 
          
 173 
• It respects the international conventions and municipal laws governing refugees. 
• It emphasizes sovereignty of the state. 
• It discusses punitive costs for officials who intentionally disregard their duties. 
 
6.1 Deportees have a right to apply for asylum 
 
The respondents argued that they were not responsible for the appellants as they were being deported by another 
country. They were in fact the responsibility of Air Namibia, on whose flight they had been brought to South Africa. They 
relied on the Chicago Convention on International Aviation, which was said to impose the duty upon the carrier [para 15]. 
This convention has been amended in 2005 to include a provision that facilitates individuals at the port of entry to apply 
for asylum. In addition, this convention has been incorporated in South African law by Civil Aviation Act 13 of 2009 (para 
25). The Home Affairs’ officials have a duty to ensure that intending applicants for refugee status are given every 
reasonable opportunity to lodge an application with the relevant Refugee Reception Office (para 22; Bula & Others v 
Minister of Home Affairs & Others (589/11) [2011] ZASCA 209 para 77). This applies to every asylum seekers whether 
they are inside the country or held in inadmissible facilities. 
The respondents also argued or submitted that while being detained at the inadmissible facility, the appellants 
were not in law in South Africa and the South African authorities and courts had no jurisdiction over them. They were 
held pending their return to Namibia and were thus not being deported. Their status in South Africa was irrelevant to their 
fate (para 15). The argument that individuals who are being held in inadmissible facility at a port of entry into the RSA are 
beyond the courts’ jurisdiction was answered in the case of Lawyers for Human Rights and Another v Minister of Home 
Affairs and Another 2004 4 SA 125 (CC), 2007 7 BCLR 775 (CC). In this case, the government contended that the Bill of 
Rights does not accord protection to foreign nationals at port of entry who have not yet been allowed formally to enter the 
country. Yacoob J held that sections 12 and 35 (2) in the Bill of Rights ‘are integral to the value of human dignity, 
equality, and freedom that are fundamental to our constitutional order. The denial of these rights to human beings who 
are physically inside the country at sea – or airports merely because they have not entered South Africa formally would 
constitute a negation of the value underlying our Constitution. It could hardly be suggested that persons who are being 
unlawfully detained on a ship in South African waters cannot turn to South African courts for protection, or that a person 
who commits murder on board a ship in South African waters is not liable to prosecution in a South African court’ (para 
20, Lawyers for Human Rights and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another (supra) para 26). Passengers on an 
international flight landing in South Africa are subject to the jurisdiction of South African courts (see Nkondo v Minister of 
Police and Another 1980 2 SA 894 (O), 1980 4 All SA 67 (O)). In this regard, courts can ascertain whether international 
laws as well as municipal laws have been complied with. 
 
6.2 International conventions and municipal laws governing refugees 
 
The respondents’ submission is not only incompatible with the provisions of the 1951 United Nations Convention on the 
Status of Refugees and its 1967 protocol as well as the 1969 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee 
problems in Africa, but also with the provisions of the Refugees Act 130 of 1998, section 6 of which provides for it to be 
applied with due regard to the provisions of the UN Convention and its protocol as well as the 1969 OAU Convention. 
The Refugees Act also provides for the admission of foreigners who find themselves in distressed circumstances owing 
to the condition enumerated in sections 2 and 3. (Para 22; section 2 of the Refugees Act deals with general prohibition of 
refusal of entry, expulsion, extradition, or return to the country in certain circumstances, while section 3 provides for 
refugee status). Refugees Act has incorporated the 1951 UN Convention and the OAU Convention of 1969 into South 
African municipal laws. Their words potently prohibit the prevention of access to the RSA of any person who has been 
forced to flee the country of his or her birth because of any of the circumstances that qualify a person for a refugee status 
(para 22; Bula & Others (supra) para 61). 
Individuals entitled to be recognised as refugees may more often than not arrive at a port of entry without the 
necessary documentations and be placed in inadmissible facility (Lawyers for Human Rights (supra) para 20). Such 
persons have a right to apply for refugee status, and it is unlawful to refuse their entry if they are bona fide in seeking 
refuge (para 22; Bula & Others (supra) para 75). There is a duty on the Department’s officials to ensure that intending 
applicants are given every reasonable opportunity to file an application with the relevant Refugee Reception Office. 
However, this does not apply to individuals who are excluded from refugee status by section 4 of the Refugees Act (para 
22; Bula & Others (supra) para 76). A person does not qualify for refugee status if there is reason to believe that he or 
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she (a) had committed a crime against peace, a war crime or a crime against humanity, as defined in any international 
legal instrument dealing with any such crimes; or (b) has committed a crime which is not of a political nature and which, if 
committed in the RSA, would be punishable by imprisonment; (c) has been guilty of acts contrary to the objects and 
principles of the United Nations Organisation or the Organisation of African Unity; (d) enjoys the protection of any other 
country in which he or she has taken residence (Refugees Act 130 of 1998, section 4). 
The provisions of the Refugees Act are also in accordance with international law and practice, as evidenced by the 
decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Amuur v France (1996) 23 EHRR 533 and Riad and Idiab v Belgium 
No 29787/03. In both cases, the court had no difficult in holding that that municipal courts had jurisdiction to deal with the 
rights of persons held in circumstances similar to those of the appellants (para 24; Bula & Others (supra) para 71). 
The appellants would face a real risk of suffering physical harm if they were forced to return to Somalia. It is 
common knowledge that Somalia is a dysfunctional state and lacks a central or effective government to protect its 
citizens. Therefore, there is no effective guarantee that appellants would not be persecuted or subjected to some forms 
of torture, or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment if they were compelled to go back to Somalia. Refugees Act seeks 
to address the prevention of this harm by preventing a refugee’s deportation. Deportation to another state that would 
result in the imposition of a cruel, unusual or degrading punishment is in conflict with the fundamental values of the 
constitution (para 26, see also Mohamed and Another v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others (Society for 
the Abolition of the Death Penalty in South Africa and Another intervening) 2001 3 SA 893 (CC), 2001 7 BCLR 685 (CC), 
paras 48, 52 and 54). The principle of non-refoulement that prescribes that no refugee should be returned to any country 
where he or she is likely to face persecution or torture has a significant importance (GM Ferreir & MP Ferreira-Snyman 
“Die beginsel van non-refoulement as grandslag van die vlugtelingereg” (2004) 2 TSAR 343, 345; WH Olivier “The new 
asylum law in South Africa” (2002) 4 TSAR 650, 666 – 667; F Jenkins “Coming to South Africa: an overview of the 
application for asylum and an introduction to Refugees Act” (1999) 24 SAYIL 182, 187 – 188; Kubuika and Another v 
Minister of Home Affairs and Others 1997 4 SA 341 (C) 343 E-G; Chahal v United Kingdom (1997) EHRR 413, para 107; 
Goodwin – Gill The refugee in international law (1996) 117; A Aust Handbook of international law 2nd ed. (2010) 176-7; A 
Katz “Refugees” in J Dugard International law a South African perspective 4th ed. (2011) 352). 
Bertelsmann AJA stated that ‘refusing a refugee entry to this country, and thereby exposing her or him to the risk 
of persecution or physical violence in his/her home country is in conflict with the fundamental values of the constitution’ 
(para 27). Potential asylum seekers and refugees held in inadmissible facility are entitled to the assistance of the 
Department of Home Affairs’ officials and need show no more than that they are persons who might qualify as refugees 
or asylum seekers (para 28). This applies to individuals or persons regardless of whether they have been previously 
admitted in South Africa as refugees or asylum seekers. 
 
6.3 Sovereignty of the state 
 
A sovereign state has exclusive control over its territory. Foreign states may exercise only such authority in its domain as 
may be agreed by international treaty (para 29). Dugard states that statehood is defined by a permanent population, a 
defined territory, government and capacity to enter into relations with other states. He adds that in order to meet this 
requirement, a state must have a government that is in effective control of its territory, and that is independent of any 
other authority (Para 29, Dugard International Law – A South African Perspective 3ed (2005) 82; Commissioner of 
Taxes; Federation of Rhodesia v McFarland 1965 1 SA 470 (W), 473G – 474A, 1965 1 All SA 389 (W); S v Banda and 
Others 1989 4 SA 519 (BG)). 
As South Africa is clearly a sovereign and independent state, the appellants are within it and entitled to the 
protection of its laws, even if they happened to have arrived in the course of being deported from another sovereign and 
independent state (para 29). So, the refugees are the responsibility of the Department of Home Affairs and it has a duty 
to admit them in the RSA. The court, through Bertelsmann AJA, stated that the appellants did not intend to abandon their 
respective refugee and asylum seeker status, and upheld their appeal with costs (paras 32 and 33). 
 
6.4 Punitive costs for officials intentionally disregarding their duties  
 
Section 7 of the Constitution imposes the duty on organs of state –and thus on officials of the Department of Home 
Affairs- to respect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights. The court found that the respondents’ officials had 
failed to comply with these demands. In the manner they dealt with the appellants, they had little regard to their fears for 
their safety if they were compelled to return to Somalia (para 33). Furthermore, the respondents failed to inform the court 
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immediately of the fact that the appellants’ files had been traced on the Department’s records (para 35). They insisted 
that they did not have any record of the appellants in their disposal. 
Bertelsmann AJA noticed that South African courts have on several occasions expressed their disquiet at the 
failure of Government officials, including the Department of Home Affairs’ officials, to respect the rights of individuals they 
deal with and to act in accordance with their duties imposed by the Constitution. (Para 36, see also Eleveth v Minister of 
Home Affairs and Another 2004 11 BCLR 1223 (T), para 45 – 48; Nyathi v MEC for Gauteng Department of Health and 
Another 2008 5 SA 94 (CC), 2008 4 BCLR 865 (CC); Total Computer Services (Pty) Ltd v Municipal Mayor, 
Potchefstroom Local Municipality and Others 2008 4 SA 346 (T), para 21, 2007 JOL 20884 (T); Van Straaten v President 
of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2009 3 SA 457 (CC), 2004 5 BCLR 480 (CC)). The court found that the 
respondents’ officials failed to understand the very objet and purpose of the Refugees Act it was their duty to apply. As a 
result, they had caused unnecessary litigation and wasted costs. The court stated that if the appellants had given 
timeous notice of an intention to apply for a punitive costs order, they would have been granted in all likelihood (para 36). 
It is submitted that punitive costs should be granted if the officials have intentionally disregarded their duties 
causing great hardship, unnecessary litigations and costs. This will encourage government officials to perform their 
duties to the best of their ability and knowledge. It will also reduce hardship to the people who are dealing with 
government officials. Punitive costs order must follow the suit regardless of whether parties to the litigation have applied 
for such an order. It is submitted that such an award is necessary in order to vindicate the fundamental right that has 




The Abdi case has created a precedent that deportees in inadmissible facility have a right to apply for asylum in the RSA. 
They are located in an area that is under the sovereignty of the RSA. Thus, the Bill of Rights, international conventions 
and municipal laws governing refugees apply to such persons. Once there is an indication to apply for asylum, the Home 
Affairs’ officials have a duty to assist the concerned person to file such an application at a Refugee Reception Office. 
Government officials must intend to perform their duties or tasks as provided by the Constitution and other 
statutes. They should be ordered to pay punitive costs if they intentionally fail to perform their tasks and cause hardship 
to the individuals who expected their assistance. The punitive costs should follow even if the parties did not apply for 
such orders. 
This judgment is consistent with the repetitive findings of our courts that excessive use of immigration detention by 
Home Affairs is unlawful, unconstitutional and a violation of our international obligations. The judgment in the Abdi case 
is, in the authors’ view, correct and gives effect to fundamental principles of the constitution, refugee laws and 
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